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The notion of data and information being different in
kind is based on the Foundationalist thesis that there exist
raw, brute, facts which constitute the data that form the
basis for information, and, ultimately, of knowledge. Foun-
dationalism fails, however, because if these data are really
different in kind from information and knowledge, then no
comparisons are possible between the former and the latter,
and the notion of data (in the sense of raw, brute, fact)
becomes useless. If, on the other hand, comparisons can
be made between data and information or knowledge, the
data would have to be of the same kind as the latter. Given
that an Information Processing System (IPS) cannot process
data except in terms of whatever representational language
is inherent to it, data could not even be apprehended by an
IPS without becoming representational in nature, and thus
losing their status of being raw, brute, facts.
The representational language of the IPS provides the
categories in terms of which the IPS ’views’ reality, and
thus this language will define what constitutes reality for
the IPS in question. Consequently, this language will define
what constitutes signals, signs, and information for the IPS,
as well. Any definition of information must therefore be
relative to a given IPS, and, in the case of a human IPS,
what is regarded in common sense terms as linguistically
encoded information cannot be independently characterized
in purely physical terms.
1. Definability of information
Every so often, it seems, information scientists are
beset by an urge to take stock of their enterprise and
begin asking themselves &dquo;What is information?&dquo; The
question is always asked with some trepidation, for in
the asking is implied that the information scientist,
whose business it is to speak knowledgeably about
information, might not really know what it is he is
talking about. And, when it then turns out that a
good answer to the question is awfully hard to come
by, there is despair and doubt about Infomiation
Science (IS) ever amounting to a ’real’ science (1-9J.
* With perfunctory apologies to Claude L6vi-Strauss.
Now it may well be the case that IS is in a prepara-
digmatic stage, and thus not quite deserving of the
exalted label ’science’ [10]. But the reason for this
ought not be that IS has not been able to define
exactly what information is. After all, the life scien-
ces have not managed to define life, and physics -
defined as the science of matter and energy - has not
been able to give us definitive definitions of matter
and energy. So in this regard IS is certainly in good
company. It seems likely that it is the search for the
definition that constitutes science, and that definitive
definitions, like absolute truths, would (if they exist
at all) be the terminal points of science, not the be-
ginnings.
Yet it is clear that if we are to investigate informa-
tion we can not start from a null definition either. We
shall have to have some notions about the nature of
the beast in order to know where and how to look for
it. In cases such as this, it is usually best to start out
from some common sense definition, something that
will help us get onto the track, though it may prove
wrong in the long run [ 11 ] . When one solicits such
common sense definitions - even those of sophisti-
cated common sense - one is likely to encounter two
kinds. The first would be definitions of a statistical
nature, involving uncertainty and entropy, derived
from Shannon and Weaver [12]. However, tlis type
of characterization of information is not much in
vogue anymore, since it leaves out what most ISists
now see as a necessary ingredient in information,
namely meaning. Shannon’s and Weaver’s is a signal-
ling theory. ISists would be interested in what is
conveyed by the signal. Therefore, so long as one
does not (pace McLuhan) regard the medium as the
message, it might turn out to be a serious case of
conceptual confusion to equate the signal with what
it conveys [1,3,13-14]. On the other hand, one may
well question (and I shall, later) whether anything
can be considered to be a signal without having to
refer to meaning. Doing so would, obviously, imply
a concept of ’signal’ different from Shannon’s and
Weaver’s.
By taking meaning to be a necessary ingredient of
information one drastically narrows the scope of the
search. Meaning is something inextricably connected
with human beings, and information thus comes to
be something that necessarily involves a human ingre-
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dient. The second kind of definition of information
that we encounter is human-oriented in this respect,
for it relates information to another human pheno-
menon, namely knowledge. But it also brings in what
is claimed to be a human-independent factor, namely
data. This second view, which is likely to be the majo-
rity view, would look something like the following:
Data are unprocessed, raw facts. Information, on the
other hand, is something more refined. If data are
raw, then information has been cooked. And, if we
continue the culinary metaphor, knowledge would
be something akin to the nourishment that is derived
from the concoction. (For common sense views along
these lines, see Letters to the Editor in Online 3(3)
(1979).)
Two tlings are to be noted about this second view.
First, if this is what IS is concerned with, then its
subject matter overlaps to a considerable degree with
that of cognitive psychology and epistemology in that
all three are concerned with the question of how
knowledge is attained. Second, both information and
knowledge are seen as derivative of data, and pre-
sumably also definable only in relation to data. Data,
however, should be intrinsically definable. In taking
this approach to the question of knowledge attain-
ment, IS would be travelling a route that is very fami-
liar to psychology and epistemology, namely the
route of Empiricist Foundationahsm.
2. Foundationalism
Foundationalism gets its name from the thesis that
there exists a rock-bottom foundation upon which
knowledge is based. Empiricist Foundationalism
holds this foundation to consist of raw, brute, factual
data about the world [15]. Data thus come to occupy
a very special position: data are foundational in vir-
tue of being unprocessed givens, and thus different in
kincl from either information or knowledge. It is this
latter thesis, that data are different in kind from
information and knowledge, that is troublesome.
At first blush, Foundationalism seems an extre-
mely attractive hypothesis, and the denial of its cen-
tral thesis, the existence of foundational data, would
seem to fly in the face of common sense. The exis-
tence of foundation data is, it is claimed, necessary
for the concepts of objectivity and truth (and all that
goes therewith) to be meaningful. If we are faced with
contradictory information, the contradiction should
be resolvable by appeal to the data, ’the facts’. And
how do we attain factual information about the
world if not by apprehending matters of fact as they
exist, i.e., by apprehending the data? And last, but
not least, Foundationalism holds out the promise that
knowledge might be attained from data by means of
an algorithm. If that were the case, the attainment of
knowledge could possibly be automated and made
more efficient than it is now when we are largely
dependent on fallible human processing. This latter
aspect of Foundationalism is one that is cherished by
organizations such as business and government who
view knowledge in terms of power. Once this idea
takes root, it follows naturally that data, the raw
material for information and knowledge, should be
regarded as a valuable resource to be gathered and
carefully managed.
This suggests a functional definition of data:
’data’ is that which serves as raw material for a pro- ,
cess that yields information [16]. We would, in other
words, have something that could be represented by
the conventional view of an Information Processing
System (IPS) which accepts data as input which then
is processed into information. But a functional defi-
nition will tell us nothing about the intrinsic proper-
ties of data that would allow us to recognize a datum
as being different in kind from information. The
Foundationalist would tend to regard an IPS as an
interface with reality, and reality as an aggregate of
data.
It is at this juncture that the sands begin to shift
under Foundationalism. The Foundationalist can
now opt for Naive Realism, according to which the
entities, properties, and relations of the world (i.e.,
the data) somehow enter the IPS directli,, in their
intrinsic jorm. Under these circumstances the data
would undoubtedly be different in kind from any-
thing processed by the IPS. However, it should not
require more than a moment’s reflection to realize
that this option is absurd. But the alternative would
have to be some form of indirect Realism (provided,
of course, that one is committed to some form of
Realism), and then the contention that there could
be a categorical distinction in kind between data
and their supposed derivatives becomes quite dubious.
Imagine being an IPS. What, now, would be your
view of the data, i.e., the input? Would you have
any way of transcending your perceptions? What
you are aware of appears to be simply given [17], in
the sense that you would be conceiving of it in some
kind of terms, and you could not choose between
alternative terms from some term-free point of view.
In other words, no IPS could have access to matters
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not reprensentable in the ’language’ in terms of
which the IPS functions. Matters not representable
are not accessible, and matters accessible are so only
in virtue of being presented in the language of the
IPS. Thus from the point of view of any IPS, its data
are going to appear ultimate to it - not because of
any inherent qualities of its ’perceptions’, but simply
because it cannot ’see things’ in any other way.
The fact of these matters seems to be that an
IPS - any IPS, including one that is a sentient being
- is a prisoner of its own representational processes:
We can never escape a point of view. This, of course,
was Kuhn’s (18J message: we are paradigm-bound -
and not only in doing science, but in all our cogni-
tive-perceptual activities. Now, consider again the
basic Foundationlist tenet, that the data are the rock-
bottom facts. They would be rock-bottom in virtue
of not having been transmuted into any kind of repre-
sentational form. Thus the truth of a proposition, a
piece of information, could be judged by its degree of
correspondence with the data. But, in order for the
two (the data and the information) to be at all com-
parable, they shall have to be of the same general
kind. They would both have to be compared within
one and the same representational framework, other-
wise there could be no basis for comparison (this is
the old apples-and-oranges problem). But this, of
course, defeats the assumption that data and informa-
tion would be different in kind.
The Foundationalist’s dilemma is this: in order to
be foundational, data must be raw and untainted by
any processing. But if they are, they cannot be
apprehended by an IPS, for it can apprehend only in
terms of its representational language. However, if the
data are represented in the IPS, they are no longer
unprocessed and raw. Once the data - taken as the
brute facts of ’outside’ reality - are brought ’inside’
the IPS, they would have to be represented in terms
of whatever representational language the IPS em-
ploys. This makes comparisons between information
and ’data’ possible, but ’data’ has now lost its essen-
tial property of rawness.
A Foundationalist position on the nature of data
seems untenable, and with it goes the notion of abso-
lute objectivity. Data are not different in kind from
information’, not raw, not &dquo;inherently inviolate and
... informatively committal about the nature of the
world&dquo; [19]. What we take to be data cannot be
singled out as possessing any special characteristics
that set them apart from information. Thus they can
not be characterized intrinsically, but only extrinsic-
ally as a starting point for some cognitive venture
(and among such ventures should be included all
scientific activities such as theory formation and
hypothesis testing). But being a starting point is not
the same as being a foundation, for a starting point is
not sacrosanct - the edifice can stand even if the star-
ting point is discredited. Not so in the case of founda-
tions.
This seems to be the way the modelling of reality
actually works (as opposed to how the Foundationa-
list thinks it ought to work). What is considered to be
given (data) at the beginning of an investigation may
be altered and perhaps even completely abandoned as
the investigation progresses. Under these circumstan-
ces, what is regarded as truth and reality cannot be a
matter of correspondence, as under Foundationalism,
for there is nothing foundational to correspond to.
Instead, truth becomes a matter of coherence: the
representations must be internally coherent. In the
case of human beings, the coherence should ideally
apply to the totality of one’s beliefs. (For more on
these ideas, see [20]).
3. Communication
Considerations of how data, information, and
knowledge could interact thus lead to the conclu-
sion that all three should be referred to the cate-
gory of the cooked. But then, all three would be
purely intra-personal in nature. This is, of course,
problematic for those who regard IS as concerned
with communication, with the inter-personal trans-
mission and extra-personal storage of something
they call ’information’. The existence of commu-
nication is, of course, not in doubt, and commu-
nication does not proceed by means of magic or
telepathy, but via a physical bridge, some extra-
personal medium. We speak of information and
knowledge being stored in various forms, occurring
in print, being fou&dquo;j in journals, and so on. Infor-
mation and knowledge are also said to be trans-
mitted orally from one person to another by
means of speech. The question is whether such
common sense claims can be backed up by any
coherent characterization of this physical bridge
- whether information and/or knowledge can be
given meaningful physical definition, even in prin-
ciple.
For something to be communication, it must be
intentional in nature. When I see certain tracks in
the snow, I may come into possession of the
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information that a wolf has passed by my house.
But this is not something that the snow (nor the
wolf, for that matter) is communicating to me
[21]. In dealing with written or oral language the
question of intentionality seldom becomes acute.
When confronted with something we take to be
linguistic in nature, we assume that it is intentional
and meaningful (even in the cases where nobody
understands it, as in the case of Etruscan writings).
The assumption is that a meaningful ’message’ has
been intentionally encoded in a physical medium,
and that it can be decoded by anyone who knows
the code.
But how do we know that something is linguistic
in nature; how do we know that some physical
configuration or event constitutes an encoded mes-
sage ? It is widely assumed there is something in
the physical phenomenon itself that announces its
informational nature. A further assumption is usually
made as well, namely that the physical phenomena
that have these informational features stand in a cau-
sal relationship to the cognitive phenomena of infor-
mation and knowledge (c.f. [2]). If this is the case,
then it should be possible to isolate those features
that define informational content and study them by
the methods of physics. From here the step is not
great to the claim that information in all its forms can
be reduced to physics. By now we seem to have slid
over into a signalling theory, where certain physical
features (or feature complexes) would serve as foun-
dational data.
4. The proposition of information as a physical surro-
gate of knowledge
In a series of recent articles, Farradane has pro-
posed that information be defined as &dquo;a physical sur-
rogate of knowledge (e.g. language) used for commu-
nication&dquo; [22-23]. In fact, he holds a physical defi-
nition to be necessary if IS is ever to become an expe-
rimental (and by implication, a ’real’) science:
If information science is to be at all an experimental science,
one must have some observable elements or phenomena
which can be isolated for initial study, and proceed from
these to the more complex and difficult phenomena related
to them [22].
There is a clear Foundationalist bias in evidence
here. Farradane wants &dquo;information&dquo; in the form of
&dquo;the written or spoken surrogate of knowledge&dquo; to
be the &dquo;invariant starting point&dquo; for further investi-
gations. The invariance of the starting point, and
hence its foundational nature, is to be guaranteed by
its being physically defined. The appeal to physics
is typical of Foundationalism. Physics is taken to
be the ultimate science to which all natural pheno-
mena are reducible, dealing as it (supposedly) does
with the absolute rock-bottom, raw, brute, facts of
the world.
There is a distinction (one that Farradane is
aware of [6 J) that must be made here for the sake
of making clear what it is we are dealing with. There
is an ambiguity in the word ’information’, in that it
may signify, on the one hand, a cognitive phenome-
non, and, on the other hand, certain physical phe-
nomena that are somehow related to the cognitive
ones. Analogous ambiguities are found in the case
of ’color’ and ’sound’. A color may be regarded as
electromagnetic radiation of a certain wavelength,
or it may be regarded as a phenomenal quality,
something that is experienced. Similarly, a sound
may be an acoustic waveform, or something that
is heard (phenomenal sound). In either case, it is
obvious that experienced colors and sounds could
not exist outside the human mind. The difference
in kind between the phenomenal and the physical
can be made vivid by the realization that expe-
rienced pains are nothing like that which supposedly
causes them, e.g., the sharp tip of a needle pressed
against your skin. Information can hardly be said to
be a phenomenal quality, but information as ’cog-
nized’ could not exist outside the human mind either,
and would clearly be different in kind from anything
outside the mind that one might try to correlate
with it.
For a definition such as Farradane’s to work, one
should have to postulate the existence of a biunique
relationship (if and only if) between phenomenal and
physical events, categories, and entities. Moreover,
the relationships of type-identity and similarity
expressed in terms of phenomenal natural classes
(e.g., same color, similar color) should be explicable
in terms of their correlations with natural classes of
physics. Only under such conditions of biuniqueness
would it make sense to study and experiment with
Farradane’s &dquo;observable elements or phenomena&dquo;
and expect them to have any bearing on the study of
(supposedly) corresponding psychological events.
Tlus is the essence of physicalistic reductionism: that
all psychological events and categories could be
shown to be coextensive with physical events and
entities [24].
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Consider the role of meaning in information. Mea-
ning is a necessary ingredient of information, but
what would be a physical surrogate of meaning? Mea-
ning is not to be found in any purely physical pheno-
menon. Rather, meaning is given to, ascribed to, cer-
tain events, and it is only in virtue of such ascriptions
that they become signs or signals. Nothing is a sign or
symbol in and of itself; certainly a mere variation in
some physical magnitude is not sufficient for some-
thing to be a signal. It must be kept in mind that per-
ception is not a passive process of receiving impres-
sions from without. Rather, perception is a constitu-
tive process of individuation and categorization,
involving cognitive aspects such as judgement. It is
this active nature of perception that makes correla-
tions between cognitive-perceptual categories and
’the outside world’ so intractable.
5. Language
Let us now take a look at language, since this is
what Farradane suggests as an example of what he
has in mind, and since meaning, of course, belongs in
the domain of the linguistic. Farradane is clearly
wrong in taking language to be a surrogate for know-
ledge. First, language is not a surrogate for anything,
and second, all information is certainly not know-
ledge. Farradane has apparently fallen victim to
another instance of the kind of ambiguity we just
discussed above. Language - the real thing - is a
cognitive phenomenon, and does not exist outside the
human mind [25]. But language can be given physical
representation, graphically (writing) or acoustically
(speech). It is these physical representations (or surro-
gates, if you wish) that Farradane wants to regard as
information.
What, then, is the relationship between (cognitive)
language and its ’physical surrogates’? The answer is,
that no one has been able to establish any constant
correlations between any linguistic categories or clas-
ses and any physical events or entities. There is
nothing in the acoustic stream of speech that corre-
sponds to perceived entities such as words or speech
sounds (phonemes), not to mention such higher level
entities as sentences. And, as for graphic surrogates
for language, just consider what you are looking at
right now. Physically, what is there is a collection of
streaks of ink on paper. Now, would it be possible to
establish any coherent correlations between a piece
of information such as, say, &dquo;My dog is bald&dquo;, and
streaks of ink? Just consider how many different
kinds of graphical representation this particular piece
of information could have. It could be represented in
different languages, in different alphabets (Latin,
Cyrillic, Arabic, etc.), syllabaries, ideograms, in Morse
code, in different handwritings, in ink, pencil, diffe-
rent type fonts, upper case or lower, etc., etc., etc.
Are there any natural classes of physics that could be
established among these variations that could be
shown to correlate with the information that &dquo;My
dog is bald&dquo;? Not likely! And could it be shown that
the relation between this information and the infor-
mation that &dquo;My cat is bald&dquo; would be due to a syste-
matic alternation between two classes of physical
events? Less likely still!
To be scientifically useful, the thesis of physical
definability of information would have to mean that
occurrences of the same information should be cor-
relatable with an invariant set of physical defining
features, such that pieces of different information
would be different exactly in virtue of being corre-
lated with different features, whereas, on the other
hand, tokens of the same piece of information would
be correlated with the same set of features. Thus the
essential taxonomic function of a science, to show
how the sameness and difference between tokens of
information could be accounted for, would be ful-
filled. No such sets have ever been found, and there
is little reason to believe that any every will. The rea-
son for this is that the properties constituting such a
set would not form a natural class of physics. The set
would, in the case of the information that &dquo;My dog is
bald&dquo;, be disjoint in physical terms, in that it would
contain acoustic features (for the spoken word) and
features pertaining to streaks of ink on paper (for the
written word), and so on. And the only criterion for
separating these acoustic features and streaks of ink
from other acoustic features and streaks of ink would
not be physical at all, but rather semantic. Thus the
set of physical features would constitute a set ONL Y
in virtue of having been correlated with the same
information (i.e., the semantic content of the sen-
tence), not on the basis of any physical criteria. In
other words, the natural classes of information (what
makes for inforniational sameness or difference) are
not coextensive with any natural classes of physics.
Thus a physical definition of information could not
stand alone, but would always have to be created on
the basis of meaning [26-27J.
In the final analysis, the problem lies in the
assumption that physics is epistemically neutral, that
it deals with the raw, brute facts of the world. But
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physics is, of course, just as theory-bound as any
other human endeavour, and its statements are cast in
representational form which always reflects a point
of view. And the forms that have been found to be
useful in physics just do not seem to dovetail too
well with the forms that are useful in describing
language and phenomenal qualities. Physics is not a
&dquo;binary science&dquo;, as Pearson [28] would have it. A
physical relation such as ’longer than’ is not simply
a relation between two objects, but must (as we have
learned from Special Relativity) specify the frame of
reference in which the observation of length takes
place. Length is a relative concept that only reveals
a relation between the observer and an object. And
as to the existence of objects, those quintessential
entities of Foundationalist speculation, they too
might simply be creatures of our point of view. This,
at least, is the view of the quantum physicists:
The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose
existence is independent of human consciousness turns out
to be in conflict with facts established by experiment [29].
Thus the Kantian claim that objects conform to
our modes of cognition has re-emerged in modern
science:
The ’furniture of the world’ does not come prepackaged in
the form of individuals with properties, apart from human
intervention: Either the analysis provided by the cognitive
system that we might call ’common sense understanding’
or the more self-conscious idealizations of the scientist
seeking to comprehend some aspect of physical or mental
reality [30]. (c. f. also [31].)
To insist on proceeding from raw things-in-them-
selves (alias ’data’) toward information and know-
ledge would thus seem rather futile. 
_
6. Knowledge
In conclusion, let me say a few words about know-
ledge. Strictly speaking, what is characteristic of
knowledge is that it is always true. Consider the
sentence
Fritz knows that the earth is flat.
This sentence is clearly anomalous, and the anomaly
lies in the violation of the requirement that the verb
’to know’ have as its object a proposition that is true
[32]. This is a view shared by Foundationalist and
non-Foundationalist alike. The difference between
the two lies in their differing criteria for truth: Is it a
matter of coherence or correspondence? In any
case, a clear difference can be made between infor-
mation and knowledge: We may have false informa-
tion, but to speak of false knowledge is like speaking
of false truths - it is a cotitradictio ill adjecto. At
any given time we entertain numerous propositions
that may be true or false. These are beliefs. Beliefs,
too, may turn out to be false, but those that are true
and justified constitute knowledge. Thus ’knowledge’
would be a proper subset of ’belief. This distinction
may not be of any immediate relevance to IS, since
physical definition of ‘belief is as remote as any
other. Nevertheless, since we are groping about for
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